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INTRODUCTION

Between thirty and forty years ago, and especially in the early x93o's, it seemed
that the law of conflict of laws might be about to become a branch of constitutional
law.1 The United States Supreme Court was using the due process of law clause
of the fourteenth amendment, and to a lesser extent the full faith and credit clause,
to prescribe for state courts in choice-of-law cases, as well as in jurisdiction to tax
and judicial jurisdiction cases, the one permissibly governing law by which the facts
could constitutionally be controlled.2 Since the early 1940's, however, the Supreme
Court has backed away from this "single proper law" approach, and has in choice
of law, taxation, and judicial jurisdiction cases held that constitutional requirements
are satisfied by a widening variety of factual contacts with the state whose law is
chosen as governingY Typically, the Court today says:
Where more than one state has a sufficiently substantial contact with the activity in
question, the forum state, by analysis of the interests possessed by the states involved,
could constitutionally apply to the decision of the case the law of one or another state
having such an interest in the multi-state activity.4
Politically, it is fair to say that the Court today embraces a "states' rights" theory
in the law of conflict of laws.
Due process approval of modern "long-arm statutes" which permit state courts
to exercise judicial jurisdiction under the "fair play and substantial justice" testO
0B.A. 1922, University of Arkansas; LL.B. 1927, S.J.D. 1932, Harvard University. Distinguished
Professor of Law, University of Arkansas, and Professor of Law, New York University. Formerly
Associate Justice, Supreme Court of Arkansas. Author, THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAws (1959).
'Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws,
39 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1926); Ross, Has the Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional Law?,
(1931)..Cf. Schofield, The Supreme Court of the United States and the
15 MINN. L. R-v..6s
Enforcement of State Law by State Courts, 3 ILL. L. REv. 195 (s9o8).
' Among choice-of-law cases, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292
U.S. 143 (r934), marked the extreme of this series. It corresponded in this respect with First National
Bank of Boston v. State of Maine, 284 U.S. 312 (1932), which held the only state that could collect a
death tax on a decedents intangible property (corporate stock) was the state where he was domiciled
at death.
'See State Tax Commissioner of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942), which overruled First
National Bank of Boston v. State of Maine, supra note 2, and left the state free to levy death taxes at
the debtor's domicile and at the place where the specialty instrument, if any, was kept, as well as at the
owner-creditor's domicile. The theory is that any state whose law affords substantial benefit or
protection to the property may tax it.
'Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. x, 15 (x962).
'lnternational Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Contrast Western Union Telegraph
lCo. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (596!) (jurisdiction to escheat choses in action, as against non-party
claimants).
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on bases which would have been unthinkable in the days of Pennoyer v. Nefl# runs
parallel to the current approval of similar choice-of-law freedom. Contacts sufficient
to satisfy "fair play and substantial justice" for judicial jurisdiction under the due
process clause will often satisfy whatever test (perhaps the same test) the same
constitutional clause prescribes for legislative jurisdiction. It cannot be concluded,
however, that identical facts automatically mark the outer limits of "fair play and
substantial justice" for both constitutional purposes. The "fairness" and "justice"
which the due process clause requires depend upon the purposes and functions of
the law's operation in each specific separated context. Fairness and justice are
relative things, not absolutes. The related questions of what law may govern and
what court may act are similar though not the same. The lines that delineate the
answers to the questions seem to be converging but they have not merged.7
I
Tim CONSTITUTIONAL

FRAMEWORK

The due process clause is the part of the Constitution which has been relied upon
for most purposes of federal control over the broad field of conflict of laws. It is the
only clause that has been relied upon substantially in the judicial jurisdiction cases.
Along with the commerce clause, plus occasionally the equal protection and privileges
and immunities clauses, it prescribes territorial limitations upon all kinds of state
taxation. Divorce jurisdiction is governed by a due process concept, though the
scope of faith and credit to divorce decrees appears to have more practical significance than does the constitutional limitation on jurisdiction, and the two concepts
have not been combined into one in the divorce and other domestic status cases.
In the criminal cases, as in divorce cases, there has been no separation of the
question of judicial jurisdiction from the question of what substantive law is
governing; in both areas it is assumed that a state which has judicial jurisdiction
will also apply its own relevant law to the merits of the case. Criminal jurisdiction decisions in the states are usually controlled by state constitutional provisions, such as those requiring trial in "the vicinage of the offense," but the
federal essence of these is found in or through the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause. That clause, by its catch-all requirement of what is generally termed
"fair play and substantial justice," serves better than any other to bar hog-wild
misapplications of any kind of irrelevant law to a set of extrastate facts.
On choice-of-law questions in civil cases, the tendency has been to treat all relevant
federal constitutional clauses as the combined sources of whatever territorial limits
there are on state power. The due process clause and the full faith and credit clause
a95 U.S. 714 (1878). See Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer Is Dead, Long Live Pennoyer, 30 Rocxy Mr. L.
Rav. 285 (1958); Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Cim. L. REV. 569 (1958); Reese
and Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IowA L. REv.
249 (1959); Cleary, The Length of the Long Arm, 9 J. PuB. L. 293 (196o).
'See Leflar, The Converging Limits of State Jurisdictional Powers, 9 J. PuB. L. 282, 292 (196o).
Compare Briggs, Jurisdiction by Statute, 240mo Sr. L.J. 223 (1963).
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are the ones most often employed, usually not in the same case but sometimes on
almost indistinguishable problems. The equal protection and privileges and immunities clauses are used infrequently and the commerce clause almost not at all.
There are some sets of facts to which one clause or another, alone, has to be
applied, either because the special fact situation so limits it, or for historical reasons.
Thus, in Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 8 the full faith and credit clause could not be
used because the claim sued on in Texas arose in no sister state but rather in Mexico,
so that the due process clause was the only constitutional provision that fitted the
facts. Choice-of-law problems that inhere in suits on sister state judgments are all
handled under the full faith and credit clause because that clause was deliberately
framed to govern those cases. As an original matter, and still today as a matter of
logic and even of good sense, it could be urged that choice-of-law questions ought
all to be put under the due process clause, thus permitting a state court to apply
to the facts before it any law which does not violate "fair play and substantial
justice" as defined under that clause, leaving the full faith and credit clause to deal
altogether with denials of access to a local forum's courts and remedies for the
enforcement of sister state claims and obligations whose substantive existence was
independently assured. That would have made for an easier outline of the sources
and limits of power. But that is not the way the Supreme Court has developed the
cases. It has run them together.
The equal protection'0 and privileges and immunities1 clauses have not been
much used for controlling state choice of law. They are by their terms designed
to guard against discriminations directed toward "persons" and "citizens" (which
surely includes residents) of sister states, and extrastate factors such as domicile or
geographical origin of rights claimed may be involved in these prohibited discriminations. Thus, rules basing choice of law upon unreasonably discriminatory
8 281 U.S. 397 (1930)'Most of the commentators have found it necessary to treat the two clauses together, when dealing
with federal control over state choice of law, though they usually assign different functions to the
clauses. See Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field ol
Conflict of Laws, 39 HARV. L. REv. 533, 538, 548 (1926) (derives assistance for some cases also
from the contracts clause); Hilpert & Cooley, The Federal Constitution and the Choice of Law, 25
WAss. U.L.Q. 25, 39 (1939); Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 VANn. L. REv. 581, 584
(1953); Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial
Function, 26 U. Cm. L. Rev. 9, 13, 83 (1958); Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit
Limitations on a State's Choice of Law, 44 IOWA L. REV. 449, 490 (1959): "The full faith and credit
clause places a further limitation on a state's choice of law than is imposed by the due process
clause if the interest of the state, which gives it the reasonable contact under due process, is outweighed by the need for national uniformity in the solution of the particular issue being litigated"; Note,
35 COLUm. L. REv. 751, 758-59 (935): "Apparently the 'governmental interest' is to be ascertained for
purposes of full faith and credit by the same considerations which validate the statute under the due
process clause." As an illustration of the correlation of the two clauses, see John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 182 (1936), where Brandeis, J., cited Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, supra
note 8, a pure due process decision, as supporting a result which he grounded on the full faith and
credit clause.
" See Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Equal Protection,
28 U. CHi. L. Rev. i (196o).
"' See Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Privileges and
Immunities, 69 YtA.E L.J. 1323 (5960).
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distinctions between different "persons within the jurisdiction," or classes of such
persons, or between local citizens and citizens of sister states, might well be held
to violate one or the other of these clauses. It is the personal or class discrimination
that the clauses are directed against, however, and not the wrong choice of law as
such.
Similarly, the "law of the land" clause, embracing not only federal statutes but
also "treaties" with other nations, fixes very definite limits upon state choice of law.
Treaties may permissibly cover as yet undetermined but certainly tremendous
areas of foreign and international transactions, and in so far as they prescribe
governing law for these transactions they supersede local choice-of-law rules.1 2 By
the same token, cases which fall within areas taken over by the Congress under the
commerce,' 3 bankruptcy, 14 or other clauses that confer implementing power upon
it are outside the control of all contrary state law including state law on choice
of law, and the same is true of cases which fall within the Clearfield'5 rule of
"federal common law" governing nonstatutory matters of peculiarly federal concern.' These matters that are controlled directly by federal treaties, statutes, and
common law present, however, a problem that does not come under the head of
federal control over state choice of law. They present situations in which no state
choice-of-law rule whatever is applicable, because they cannot be controlled by state
law. They need not be mentioned again in this study.
The "public acts" part of the full faith and credit clause is what causes it to overlap the due process clause. The two quoted words, ignored until recent years,"
are not yet defined, though the process of definition is now going on. That state
" Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (i96i) (treaty with Yugoslavia controlled descent of Oregon
property on alien owner's death). See Bayitch, Conflict of Law in United States Treaties, 8 MIAMI
L.Q. 501 (0954).
"E.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Boegli, 251 U.S. 315 (i9o) (Hepburn Act superseded application of state law to tort claims for mental anguish in connection with interstate telegrams); O'Brien v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F.2d 539 (ist Cir. 1940) (similar result for defamation cases).
14 E.g., Vanston Bondholders' Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 146 (946).
"Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (943).
" D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942) (question whether
federal agency is holder in due course of promissory notes pledged to it as security held governed by
"federal common law" rather than by law of any state having contact with the transaction); American
Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 292 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. i961) (construction of
subcontract under federal defense contract).
"'The history of the full faith and credit clause was itself largely ignored until this century, though
it has lately excited considerable interest. The best study of it is Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit
Also
to Judgments and Public Acts: A Historical Analytical Appraisal, 56 MICH. L. REV. 33 (1957).
see Costigan, History of the Adoption of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 4 CoLUm. L. REv. 470
(1904); Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause, 81 U. PA. L. Rav. 371 (i933); Radin, The
Authenticated Full Faith and Credit Clause: Its History, 39 ILL. L. REv. 1 (1944); Page, Full Faith
and Credit: The Discarded Constitutional Provision, 1948 vis. L. REv. 265; Sumner, The Full-Faithand-Credit Clause: Its History and Purpose, 34 OrE. L. REV. 224 (1955). On the function and
potentialities of the clause generally, see Jackson, Full Faith and Credit: The Lawyer's Clause of the
Compare Waite, C. J., in Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Wiggins
Constitution, 45 CoLum. L. REv. i (945).
Ferry Co., 119 U.S. 615, 622 (1887): "Without doubt... [the full faith and credit clause] implies
that the public acts of every state shall be given the same effect by the courts of another state that
they have by law and usage at home."
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statutes are "public acts" seems established, 8 which means that full faith and
credit, or at least some faith and credit, 9 must be given in each state to private rights
and defenses conferred by state statutes, or at least to those conferred by somc
statutes. Just as with the "judicial proceedings" part of the clause, the process of
giving faith and credit is unlikely to be called for unless some person asserts in
court a claim or defense based upon what he describes as a "public act" of a sister
state.
Apart from statutes as such, what manifestations of governmental authority
constitute "public acts"? The pronouncement of a judgment by a competent court
is certainly a "public act" in the official sense, but it is covered by the "judicial proceedings" part of the constitutional clause. The same is true of the determinations
of an administrative agency exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. 0 The
scope of faith and credit required for these has been somewhat clarified.
What about an appellate court's opinion which not only sets out the court's
judgment but serves in its ratio decidendi as a precedent for the determination of
future cases, thus constituting a promulgation of law in very nearly the same sense
as a legislatively promulgated statute? In other words, are claims based on the
common law of State X entitled to faith and credit in State F? It has been suggested
that if the common law of X goes back to a reception statute which formally adopted
the English common law, as is true in most of the American states,2 this suffices to
give the state's common law the overall statutory status that the term "public act"
traditionally applies to. 22 A difficulty with this is that the reception statutes invariably adopt the English law as of some stated time-the fourth year of James I
(1607), or i62o, or 1776-and a judicial precedent announced in State X in 196o
was simply no part of the law of England at any of these dates. The very setting of
fixed dates by the reception statutes is a declaration that judge-made law differs from
date to date. On the other hand, it may be urged that the reception statutes really
adopted the common law system, not just a given set of rules and precedents that
existed in England at some named date, so that even the current decisions of the X
court come within the legal system which the statute put into effect. Regardless of
formalistic analysis, there seems to be as much merit in giving faith and credit to
private claims and defenses based on judge-made law as to those based on legislatively
enacted law. The official character of the law's promulgation is as real in one case as
in the other; in each case the rule of law derives from the official act of a public
agency. Unless the United States Supreme Court declares otherwise, we had better
" Langmaid, The Full Faith and Credit Required for Public Acts, 24 ILL. L. REV. 383 (1929), was

one of the early studies reaching this conclusion.

And see Field, judicial Notice of Public Acts Under

the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 12 MINN. L. REV. 439 (1928).
" See infra notes 31-33, 35.

-"See Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935); Industrial Comm'n of Wisconsin v. McCartin,
330 U.S. 622 (1947).
" See Hall, The Common Law: An Account of Its Reception in the United States, 4 VAND. L. Rv.
791 (1951).

11 Hilpert & Cooley, The Federal Constitution and the Choice of Law, 25 WASH. U. L.Q. 27, 34 (1939);
L. REV. 581, 603 0953).
Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 VANDn.
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assume that a state's common law is entitled to the same faith and credit as are its
3
statutes.
On their respective faces, the due process clause is negative, telling the states what
they must not do, and the full faith and credit clause is affirmative, telling the states
that they must do certain things. As the two clauses stand today, however, in the
substantial absence of congressional implementation of either of them, they both
operate in essentially the same fashion, each setting minimum limits on what the
states are free to do.
The due process clause does not require states to create any rights or obligations.
It rather puts an outer limit on the extent to which a state may "deprive" persons of
rights, including defenses, (involving life, liberty and property) which are already
and independently existent under local law, or under some other state's or nation's
law, or under the "law of the land."2 The due process clause does not tell us
which state's law must be applied to determine the legal rights and duties that grow
out of a given set of facts; it only tells us which state's, or states', law must not be
applied. True, an inference may follow that some state's law must be applied if to
apply no law would operate to deprive a person of the sort of rights that may not
constitutionally be taken away from him. But the clause has not been deemed to
create any such affirmative requirement as to claims based on extrastate facts. It
merely has that incidental effect, sometimes.
The required recognition and enforcement of extrastate claims, in so far as they
depend upon the laws of sister states, 5 would rather seem to be the function of the
full faith and credit clause. Yet that clause, except as to judgments, has done little
to assure enforcement throughout the nation of claims based on extrastate law. Up
to now, in cases not involving judgments, the clause has been for the most part
effectual only to do the same sort of thing that the due process clause does, which is,
to prevent a forum state from applying some wrong law to control claims and
defenses asserted under extrastate facts, thereby incidentally inducing the forum to
apply what is regarded as the proper law, or a proper law. It thus like the due
process clause has prescribed a minimum of propriety, a choice-of-law rule setting
outer limits as to what may be done, not generally but in a few special situations only.
The few cases in which the full faith and credit clause has been employed to
assure enforcement of unadjudicated extrastate claims afford no clear picture of
"See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 436 (943): "...the full faith and credit...
to which local common and statutory law is entitled under the Constitution and laws of the United
States" (dictum by Stone, C.J.); Jackson, Full Faith and Credit: The Lawyer's Clause of the
Constitution, 45 CoLn. L. REv. 1, 12 (1945): "...the Court has so acted and talked that we may
deal with this part of our subject on the assumption that what is entitled in proper cases to credit
is the law of a state by whatever source declared"; Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law:
Governmental Interests and the judicial Function, 26 U. CmI. L. Ray. 9, 13 (1958). Generally, see
Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 H~Axv. L. REv. 1210 (1946).
" As to "natural law" rights, it is assumed that they either are discoverable under the law of one of
these political entities or else do not exist for purposes of due process protection.
'"The "act of state" doctrine, tentative and incomplete though it be, is beginning to serve the
purposes of a full faith and credit rule between nations. See Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53
AM. J. INT'L L. 826 (1959); Note, 75 HAv. L. REv. 1607 (1962); Note, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 234 (1960).
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what access to courts the clause requires. One thing that is clear is that the matter
is not now as urgent as it seemed at one time. The development of "long-arm
service" statutes2 6 is making it normally possible to secure first judgments in the

state where the cause of action arose, regardless of a defendant's persistent absence
therefrom, which judgments will in turn be entitled to faith and credit in the state
where the defendant or his property are located. Thus ultimate sister state enforcement of valid claims is becoming reasonably effective without the compulsion of full
faith and credit to "public acts" as such. Despite this, no one can doubt that
ready extrastate enforcement of unadjudicated transitory causes of action makes for
a better economic life among people living in a federal nation.
One area in which states have been required to entertain suits on sister state claims
is that in which all the stockholders of an insolvent corporation have been ordered
by a court or administrative agency at the corporate domicile to pay an assessment
to a regularly appointed statutory liquidator, and action is then brought by the liquidator in another state against particular stockholders to collect the assessment.
Most of these cases can be explained under the "full faith and credit to judicial
proceedings" head. 7 Though the assessment order in the first state is based upon a
statute, or "public act," the proceeding fixing the assessment is normally judicial in
character. It may have been held before an administrative tribunal rather than a
court, and it had to be a class action, but it was in any event an adjudication of the
legal propriety of the assessment upon the stockholders. In that character it is as
clearly entitled to sister state faith and credit2" as is a judgment rendered by a court
as such, and for the same reasons. One important case, however, requires further
explanation. In Broderick v. Rosner," a New York administrative assessment had
evidential status only and apparently lacked judicial character, yet was nevertheless
held entitled to full faith and credit in New Jersey on the idea that the statute and
the possibly non-judicial administrative order in combination were "public acts"
entitled to constitutional protection. New Jersey was required to entertain the
liquidator's action against local stockholders of the New York corporation. A
closely related situation is that in which a law of the first state, normally administered
in some kind of judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, puts property tides into some
person such as a statutory liquidator or an attaching creditor. Here again the full
faith and credit clause requires other states to respect the tides thus created, 9
"' Supra notes 5, 6.

- Bernheimer v. Converse, 2o6 U.S. 5x6 (1907); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912);
Chandler v. Peketz, 297 U.S. 6o9 (1936); Hood v. Guaranty Trust Co., 270 N.Y. 17, 2o0 N.E. 55
(1936). But see Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500 (1938) (such judgment not effective in
second state unless statute at place of incorporation provided for representation of stockholders'
interests by corporation in action there).
"' See note 2o supra.
20 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
50Relfe v. Rundle, 103 U.S. 222 (188o)
(statutory liquidator); Clark v. Williard, 292 U.S. 112
(1934) (statutory liquidator); Green v. Van Buskirk, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 307 (1866), 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
139 (i868) (attaching creditor). This of course assumes that the first state, as situs or on some other
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by entertaining actions based upon them. In these cases the "public acts" and the
"judicial proceedings" parts of the full faith and credit clause have been inexactly
combined to create the compulsion for sister state enforcement.
The case that sets a pattern for such compulsion based altogether on the "public
acts" part of the clause is Hughes v. Fetter.' It required Wisconsin to entertain
suit upon a cause of action for wrongful death conferred by an Illinois "public act,"
that state's wrongful death act. The decision might suggest that the clause confers
as clear a constitutional right to sister state enforcement of private claims based
upon "public acts" as it does to enforcement of those based upon "judicial proceedings," save for one thing. This is the express proviso that if the forum state has a
genuinely strong local public policy against the type of claim sued upon, it need not
33
entertain the suit,32 a rule which one outstanding scholar has vigorously attacked
and which is exactly opposite the requirement that sister state judgments be enadequate basis, had legal power to create the property title in question. A first state which lacks such
power, or possesses it incompletely, may be denied faith and credit by another state whose superior
power over the res enables it to fix the title more authoritatively. E.g., see Micyr v. Federal Surety Co.,
97 Mont. 503, 34 P.2d 982 ('934), sustained in Clark v. Williard, 294 U.S. 21 (935), which completely defeated the faith and credit requirement prescribed by the earlier Clark v. Williard decision,
supra, for the same set of facts. Generally, see Note, 48 HARv. L. REv. 835 (1935).
813 4 1 U.S. 6o9 (1951). Accord: First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S.
396 (1952) (full faith and credit clause requires Illinois to entertain action based on Utah wrongful
death act). These decisions practically nullify Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142
(1907), which held that the privileges and immunities clause did not require Ohio to entertain a sister
state cause of action for wrongful death. The 3953 and 1952 decisions also assume that the causes of
action for wrongful death necessarily arose under the death acts of Illinois and Utah respectively. On
the possible incorrectness of that assumption see Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause
of Action, 73 HAsv. L. REv. 268 (x959); Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the
Conflict of Laws: Equal Protection, 28 U. CHi. L. REv. I (396o). Certainly, the clause does not
compel each forum state to enforce claims arising under the law of any and every other state whose
law might permissibly be applied to the facts. "A rigid and literal enforcement of the full faith and
credit clause, without regard to the statute of the forum, would lead to the absurd result that, wherever
the conflict arises, the statute of each state must be enforced in the courts of the other, but cannot be
in its own." Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of Calif., 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935).
'2 "We have recognized ...that full faith and credit does not automatically compel a forum state
to subordinate its own statutory policy to a conflicting public act of another state; rather it is for
this Court to choose in each case between the competing public policies involved." Hughes v. Fetter,
The Court concluded that Wisconsin actually had no strong local public
341 U.S. 6og, 6xx (951).
policy against extrastate statutory claims for wrongful death.
" Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law, 26 U. Cm. L. REV. 9, 28, 47 (1958); Currie,
Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 DuKE L.J. 1, 25-28. Also see Seidelson, Full Faith and
Professor Currie
Credit: A Modest Proposal... or Two, 31 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 462, 463 (X963).
identifies the proviso as "the Brandeis fallacy," because of language used by Brandeis, J., in Bradford
Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 16o (1932): "A State may, on occasion, decline to enforce
a foreign cause of action. In so doing, it merely denies a remedy, leaving unimpaired the plaintiff's
substantive right, so that he is free to enforce it elsewhere." It seems a bit unfair to attach the name
of Brandeis to the "fallacy," if it is a fallacy, since he was merely repeating what scores of other judges
and writers had said before him, a supposed rule which until Currie's time had not been questioned.
Actually, not many cases can be found in which a forum's local public policy was the real reason for
denying access to a local court for enforcement of a recognizedly valid sister state claim. See Paulsen &
Yet there
Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLum. L. Rav. 968, 972, 3030 (956).
are some cases, and many dicta. Union Trust Co. v. Grossman, 245 U.S. 412 (98), is typical. It is
impossible to know with certainty whether that case applied Texas rather than Illinois law on the
merits, thus determining that the plaintiff had no cause of action, or only held that the Illinois cause
of action would not be enforced in a court sitting in Texas, for reasons of strong Texas public policy.
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forced regardless of the forum's local policies? 4 The two parts of the clause do
operate differently in respect to the compulsion they, as now implemented, exert
upon the states to open the doors of their courts to extrastate causes of action.
It is possible, of course, and expectable, that the full faith and credit clause will in
future be implemented by general laws enacted by the Congress under the authority
of its second sentence, and that this implementation 5 will to some extent, and perhaps greatly, broaden the areas of compulsory "effect" exerted by the clause. This
broadening may be either in respect to access to courts or in respect to the determination of what law governs the creation of substantive causes of action and defenses
(choice-of-law questions as such), or both. It is impossible to predict now what form
congressional implementation will take, nor how far it will go. Probably it can go
quite far. Regardless of that, the present study is concerned primarily with what the
situation is today, under the meager implementation which Congress has so far
provided for the clause, and with the limits on free choice of law which this and
other constitutional clauses impose upon state courts.
II
SPECIFIC AREAS OF LIMITATION ON STATE CHOICE OF LAW

The undifferentiated application of the due process and full faith and credit
clauses to choice-of-law questions calls for a blanket description of their effect. The
limits which the Constitution imposes on free choice of law by the states are limits
imposed by the relevant constitutional clauses as a group. Original analysis by a
Brainerd CurrieO6 can show how the courts should differentiate between the clauses
and should assign completely separate effects to each, as the framers presumably
intended. Perhaps some day that will be done. The courts have not done it yet.
The only choice-of-law question for which the cases decided under the constitutional
clauses today furnish any real guidance is-what does "the Constitution" permit, or
require, the states to do? The immediately useful practical question is in terms of
the several federal constitutional clauses as the combined sources of the limits on
state power.
The specific areas within which the United States Supreme Court has undertaken
v. Lum, 21o U.S. 23o (igo8). The permissible application of the forum's own procedural rules, including its statutes of limitation, remains ostensibly the same for actions brought under
either part of the full faith and credit clause. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953)
(Pennsylvania one-year limitation rule bars action there for Alabama wrongful death though action
not barred in Alabama); McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 (1839) (Georgia five-year
limitation for actions on judgments bars action there on South Carolina judgment though action not
barred in South Carolina).
"'It is assumed that the 1948 addition of the words "such acts" to the general implementing statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (958), referring to "public acts," did not achieve any important extension of full
faith and credit, both because of the vague generality of the 5948 addition and because of its apparently
accidental character. See Goodrich, Yielding Place to New: Rest Versus Motion in the Conflict ot Laws,
Compare Dean, The
50 CoLTum. L. REv. 881, 891 (195o); Note, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 984 (1955).
Conflict of Conflict of Laws, 3 ST-. L. Rav. 388 (1951), advocating elaborate implementation.
"' E.g., Currie, The Constitution and the Transitory Cause of Action (a pts.), 73 HARv. L. REv.
36 and 268 (1959)84 Fauntleroy
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to impose limits on state choice of law are few. Frankfurter, J., in a 1955 dissenting
opinion 37 undertook to summarize in terms of factual areas the cases in which the
full faith and credit clause was relied upon by the Court, either alone or along with
the due process clause, in imposing or refusing to impose such limits. He could
have added the cases such as Home Insurance Co. v. Dick"8 in which the due process
clause alone was relied upon, without changing anything except his statistical totals.
He identified three factual groups of cases, involving (a) commercial law, (b)
insurance, and (c) workmen's compensation. Under (a) commercial law, he listed
the decisions enforcing statutory assessments against out-of-state shareholders under
the laws of the state of incorporation of an insolvent corporation"9 and simple contract cases 40 in which "less need for uniformity" was found. Under (b) insurance
he noted the fraternal benefit society cases 41 in which an "indivisible unity" among
the members is deemed to create "a resultant need for uniform construction of
rights and duties in the common fund," so that the law of the corporate society's
home state must prevail, and ordinary insurance contracts42 as to which "the forum
has had a much wider scope" if (applying its own law) it has "more than a casual
interest" in the transaction. Then under (c) workmen's compensation cases 43 he
pointed out that "the Court has likewise adopted an interest-weighing approach."
A. Insurance
The "indivisible unity" among members of fraternal insurance societies may as
a fact be arguable, but the theory of it is clear enough. It is the same theory that
subjects all the stockholders of an insolvent corporation to the law of the state of
incorporation.44 The theory can reasonably be extended to a conclusion that all
the basic rights and duties of all the stockholders (or members) of any artificial
legal entity, between themselves and toward the entity, ought to be governed by the
same law, which would have to be the law of the (or a) place45 in which the corporate
existence was created and is centered. To allow the rights and obligations of
stockholders or members to be governed by the laws of their several domiciles or by
the laws of the places where they acquired membership would create such a nonuniformity of stockholder interests as to cripple the corporate device. This overwhelming need for unity of treatment applies to such matters as the shareholders'
rights to dividends, their right to participate in the management of the corporation
'l

Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 414, 406 (1955).

38 281 U.S. 397 (1930).

O' Supra note 27. The element of faith and credit to "judicial proceedings" present in these cases
has already been noted.
"No cases compelling application of extrastate law were cited under this subhead.
" See infra note 47.
"See infra notes 48, 51-59.
"See infra notes 6o-62.
"Supra note 27.
" A difficulty exists as to corporations formally organized in one state, perhaps Delaware, but having
their principal place of business and all their major activities centered elsewhere. Probably as to these
the state of "commercial domicile" rather than that of incorporation should be looked to. See Latty,
Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137 (1955). Cf. State ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 239 Iowa
1298, 31 N.W.ad 853 (1948).
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by voting at stockholders' meetings or otherwise, their liability on unpaid subscriptions, their subjection to assessments or double liability, the existence and nature of
pre-emptive rights in other stock or property of the corporation, and other relational
rights and duties.4 As to most or all of these, competing interests of third persons
or of other states will seldom be involved. If no such outside interests are affected,
the members of the corporate body ought all to have identical rights and duties, and
a constitutional requirement that one law and one law only govern them is understandable.
Interestingly, however, the group of cases in which this constitutional requirement
has been most often applied, the fraternal benefit society insurance ones, presents
sets of facts to which the theory's application is doubtful. The latest case in the series,
Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe,4 7 is typical. The defendant, an
Ohio fraternal insurance society, had in its constitution a prohibition against bringing
any action on a death claim more than six months after disallowance of the daim
by the Supreme Executive Committee of the society. This provision was valid
under Ohio law. The defendant had qualified to engage in business in South
Dakota, and the insured, now deceased, applied in South Dakota for membership
and was a citizen of South Dakota throughout the period of his membership, up to
his death. The policy was payable to a South Dakota beneficiary, though she had
assigned her rights under it to an Ohio citizen who was plaintiff in the South
Dakota action brought on the policy. The South Dakota court applied South
Dakota law, which regards such time limitations on suit as void, and allowed recovery. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that South Dakota
must give full faith and credit to the Ohio public acts under which the defendant
society was incorporated since the common interests of the scattered members
require unity of governing law as to their interrelationship with the society and with
each other.
The real difficulty with this case and its companions is their assumption that a
genuine difference exists between fraternal insurance contracts and ordinary insurance contracts because of the "membership" feature that accompanies the fraternal
contract. Whatever may have been the sociology of life insurance in its early days,
it is today not in any realistic sense a fraternal or societal matter, even when the
policy is written by a fraternal benefit society. It is a business carried on through
a very special type of contract written with reference to experience tables which may
vary from one social group to another in respect to life expectancies but which
"This is so generally regarded as the correct choice-of-law rule that state courts have regularly
reached the result stated, so that the United States Supreme Court has had no occasion to announce
it as one based on constitutional compulsion. Cf. Fourth Nat'l Bank v. Francklyn, 12o U.S. 747 (1887).
Generally, see Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and the Impoc of Full Faith and Credit, 58 Co.tum. L. Riv. 1118 (1958).
AT33! U.S. 586 (I947). On this case, see Harper, The Supreme Court and the Conflict of Laws,
47 CoLLr-. L. Riv. 883, 895 (1947). Earlier cases in the series were Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237
U.S. 531 (91S5); Modern Woodmen v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925); and Sovereign Camp v. Bolin,
305 U.S. 66 (1938). The cases employed somewhat varying logical techniques in arriving at their
conclusions, and there were vigorous dissents on varying grounds also, but all reached the same result.
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are otherwise substantially similar. Insured persons today "buy" insurance as they
buy many other commodities, tangible and intangible. The policy or written contract
is a sort of embodiment of what is purchased, but everyone understands that the
insurer's promise to pay in the specified amount and manner on the insured's
death (or other named disability) is what is bargained for. The insurance purchased
is regarded as of one general character regardless of the internal corporate form of
the insurer. There is no practical difference in the public eye today between fraternal
insurance societies and other insurers, as far as their insurance contracts are concerned. The insurance coverage issued by the fraternal society is not merely an
incident of membership as such, but rather a separable promise having independent
economic value and involving economic hazards and risks as to which well-established standards of police power regulation by state law have developed. There is
substantially the same social justification for the application of this state law, under
the same principles of choice of law, to fraternal society insurance contracts as to
insurance contracts of other corporations. The analogy to the common interest of
members, such as shareholders, in an artificial legal entity which they control and
dominate, does not stand up. A more reasonable analogy is to choice-of-law rules
applicable to insurance contracts generally.
The rules for choice of law in contracts cases are about as unsettled as any in
the whole law of conflict of laws. That indicates that as far as the constitutionality
of contracts-conflicts rules and decisions under them is concerned, almost anything
goes. Almost, but not quite. The Supreme Court has set some limits. It held in
Home Insurance Co. v. Dic 4 that the due process clause will not permit Texas as
forum to invalidate a limitation-on-time-for-suit clause, valid in a Mexican insurance contract under Mexican law, under the pretense that limitations on time for
bringing suit are always a procedural matter. The contract was altogether a
Mexican one, without any significant Texas contacts, and no trick of characterization
would permit Texas to defeat the insurance company's valid defense under it.
No one suggests that the Dick case is wrong or is likely to be overruled. The
outer limit on constitutionality that it suggests is that no state may create (or destroy)
substantive claims by determining them under the law of a state49 which has no
substantial connection with the transaction in litigation.
The United States Supreme Court has never held, however, that this is a conclusive formulation of the outer limit which the Constitution prescribes. The early
cases edged back and forth uncertainly, searching understandably for a sound but
as yet incompletely formulated rule. Allgeyer v. Louisiana,0 not itself a contracts"281 U.S. 397 (1930).
"A state may deprive a party of due process of law by applying the law of a state having no interest
in the matter, whether the law applied is that of the forum or of another state. Usually the question

is raised by the court's application of the law of the forum. There is every reason, however, why the
Currie, The
principle should apply equally to the unwarranted application of foreign law.
Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. Cm. L.
Rav. 9, x6 (1958).
Be 165 U.S. 578 (897).

For a somewhat similar decision see St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v.

Arkansas, 26o U.S. 346 (1922).
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conflicts case, was for practical purposes the starting point. It held that Louisiana
could not under the due process clause punish an owner of Louisiana cotton for
insuring it with a foreign insurance company not qualified to do business in the
state, when all that the owner did, after taking out in another state a blanket policy
covering, upon notification, all his cotton thereafter shipped by common carrier,
was to notify the insurer by letter mailed in Louisiana that the local cotton was
being so shipped. The Louisiana contacts were held to be insufficient to justify
application of that state's police power regulation to the transaction. New York
Insurance Co. v. Cravens51 then held that fine print stipulations in an insurance
contract could not prevent the state where the contract was centered from applying
its law to the contract. The next major case, New York Life Insurance Co. v.
Head,52 came fourteen years later. It is essentially similar to Home Insurance Co.
v. Dick. In Head the original life insurance contract was assumed to have been
made in Missouri, on a New Mexico life, and a New Mexico beneficiary was later
designated. The beneficiary then in New Mexico and New York arranged for a
loan on the policy, the new contract specifying that it was governed by New York
law. The loan was not repaid and, in accordance with New York law, the policy's
accumulated reserve was applied to discharge the loan, and the life policy was
reduced to a small paid-up amount. The insured then died, and a Missouri recovery
of the original policy amount was sought on the theory that Missouri law was effective to keep the policy in force for that amount. The holding was that the
Constitution does not permit the Missouri law to preclude parties to Missouri contracts, and their privies, from later making new contracts elsewhere concerning the
same subject matter. The fact that a subject matter was first contracted about in
Missouri was not enough to enable Missouri to apply its law to later independent
contracts or transactions with which Missouri had no substantial connection.
After Head came a pair of cases which appear contradictory. The first was
New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dodge,53 which followed Head so blindly that it
went considerably beyond that case. In Dodge the original contract was made in
Missouri on a Missouri life in favor of a Missouri beneficiary, and a subsequent
loan on the policy as security was applied for in Missouri in keeping with procedures prescribed in the policy, though the loan was completed in New York with
new papers which expressly declared that they constituted a new contract governed
by New York law. The loan was not repaid. In action on the policy after death of
the insured, the Missouri court applied its law to prevent a forfeiture, and the
United States Supreme Court reversed, again holding that the loan contract was
separate, an independent New York contract to which Missouri's law could not
be constitutionally applied. The Court completely disregarded Missouri's substantial
connection with the new contract as well as the continuing Missouri connection
(absent in the Head case) with the old contract out of which the new contract
51178 U.S. 389 (19oo) •
52 234

U.S. 149 (1914)-

53 246 U.S. 357 (1918).
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developed. The second case in the pair was Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Liebing 4
which on almost indistinguishable facts permitted Missouri to apply its law to keep
the original insurance policy alive despite nonpayment of the intervening loan. The
distinction made by Holmes, J., in Liebing was that "the policy now sued upon
contained a positive promise to make the loan if asked, whereas, in [Dodge] ... it
might be held that some discretion was reserved to the company."55 It was permissible for Missouri to apply Missouri law because the intervening loan was
itself provided for by the original Missouri contract.
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co.50 went as far
as did the Dodge case beyond the "outer limits" rule derived from Home Insurance
Co. v. Dick. The action was brought in Mississippi on an employee defalcation
insurance contract made in Tennessee with the defendant Connecticut insurance
company, covering the Mississippi corporate plaintiff's employees in Tennessee,
Mississippi, and other states. The particular loss sued upon was a defalcation by a
Mississippi employee. A contract clause limited to a short period the time within
which a claim for loss could be filed after the insurance policy was terminated, and
this claim was not filed within that time because the defalcation was not sooner
discovered. The clause was valid by Tennessee but not by Mississippi law, and the
Mississippi court sustained the action, applying its own law. The United States
Supreme Court reversed, saying that Mississippi had taken the insurer's property
without due process of law when it disregarded the defense given by the Tennessee
contract which was "lawful where made." As in Dodge, the Court put its emphasis
solely on the place where the contract was made, to the exclusion of another place
which had a substantial connection with the total transaction since the insured's
domicile plus a large part of the risk insured, including the part of the risk on
which the loss occurred, were there located.
A 1936 case, John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Yates,5" fits in with
the "outer limits" rule ascribed to Home Insurance Co. v. Dick. The insurance
contract was made in New York on a New York life and with a New York
beneficiary. Material false representations which induced issuance of the policy
made it void by New York law. Action was brought by the beneficiary in Georgia
where she had acquired residence after the death of the insured, her husband.
Georgia applied its rule requiring jury determination of all fact issues, which it
characterized as "procedural," to bypass the policy's clear invalidity under undisputed
facts by New York law. The "procedural" characterization, like that in Home
Insurance Co. v. Dick, was no more than a trick to create a pretense of traditional
ground for application of the forum's law. The problem was one of what law
governed the substantive defense asserted under the contract, and Georgia could not
5' 259 U.S. 209 (1922).

' 5 1d. at 213. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924), used conversely an analysis
quite similar to that in the Liebing case, holding that subsequent transactions in Texas were referable
back to an original Tennessee contract and must be governed by Tennessee rather than Texas law.
58292 U.S. 143 (934).
r7299 U.S. 178 (936).
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constitutionally apply its law because it had no substantial connection of any sort
with the substantive transaction sued on.
One later insurance contract case does much to bring order into the field. This is
Watson v. Employers Liability Insurance Corporation.8 An insurance contract
negotiated and delivered in Massachusetts and/or Illinois covered products liability
claims against the insured anywhere in the United States. The contract included a
clause, valid under Massachusetts and Illinois law, prohibiting direct actions against
the insurer until after final determination of the insured's tort liability. The
plaintiff was injured in Louisiana by use of the insured's product and there brought
a direct action against the insurer, as permitted by a Louisiana statute. The United
States Supreme Court held that the Louisiana direct action was constitutionally
permissible despite the contract. Louisiana was the place of the tort and as such
had substantial connection with the claim sued on. 9 This was held to be enough
to satisfy the requirements of both the due process and the full faith and credit
clauses.
B. Workmen's Compensation
The Dick, Yates, and Watson cases, taken together, suggest a constitutional rule
that is fairly simple even though difficult to apply in practice. A frequent statement of it is that a state may apply its own (or any other state's) substantive law to
govern a particular transaction if, but only if, significant factual elements in the
transaction are connected with the state whose law is applied. The forum state
is free in any event to apply its own procedural rules in trying the case, but it may
not under the guise of procedural characterization apply its own law so as to deprive
parties of claims or defenses which cannot otherwise be attributed to the forum's
law. The permissible scope of procedural characterization is thus limited to rules
which genuinely relate to the manner in which judicial business is conducted, plus
a few others such as statutes of limitation, statutes of frauds, and measures of
damages-rules which have sometimes or always been traditionally characterized
as procedural for conflict of laws purposes.
The workmen's compensation cases fit in with that analysis. That would not be
true if the authority of Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper,6 ' decided in 1932,
gs348 U.S. 66 (1954). Another case, Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 363 U.S. 207 (xg6o),
might have called for a review of Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (930), had not the
Court found a different ground on which to dispose of it, at least temporarily.

But see Sun Insurance

Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 319 F.2d 5o5 ( 5 th Cir 1963), which if taken to the United States Supreme Court
may yet compel the re-examination of principles that was avoided in I96o.
,9"Persons injured or killed in Louisiana are most likely to be Louisiana residents, and even if not,
Louisiana may have to care for them.

Serious injuries may require treatment in Louisiana homes or

hospitals by Louisiana doctors. The injured may be destitute. They may be compelled to call upon
friends, relatives, or the public for help. Louisiana has manifested its natural interest in the injured by
providing remedies for recovery of damages.

It has a similar interest in policies of insurance which

are designed to assure ultimate payment of such damages.

Moreover,

instances provide the most convenient forum for trial of these cases."

Louisiana courts in most
Black, J., in

Watson

v.

Employers Liability Insurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72 (1954). Cf. Speidel, ExtraterritorialAssertion of
the Direct Action Statute, 53 Nw. U.L. Rav. 179 (1958).
0286 U.S. 145 (932).
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were not substantially destroyed today. The Clapper case held that, when the
compensation act of the state where the employment contract was made and partly
performable (Vermont) barred tort recovery completely, the state where injury
was suffered in the course of the employment (New Hampshire) could not constitutionally apply its own law to permit an optional tort recovery against the
negligent employer. The holding was that New Hampshire by applying its own law
was denying full faith and credit to the Vermont "public [workmen's compensation]
act." The prospective eclipse of Clapper became evident when the Pacific Employers6 ' case held in 1939 that California as place of injury could allow compensation recovery under its own act for injuries suffered in the course of temporary employment there even though the compensation act of Massachusetts, the place where
the contract was made and the injured man's employment was centered, purported
to be exclusive. The fact that Clapper was a torts case and Pacific Employers
involved a compensation recovery did not sensibly distinguish the cases. The
effect of the latter decision was that the full faith and credit clause does not require
a state which has such substantial contacts with the relevant facts as California had
to defer on workmen's compensation matters to the law of a state situated as was
Massachusetts. Then Carrollv. Lanza6" in 1955 made the eclipse of Clapper almost

a total one. It held that Arkansas, the place of injury in the course of employment,
could constitutionally give a tort recovery under Arkansas law despite an explicit
ban on such recovery in the compensation law of Missouri where the contract of
employment was made between Missouri parties. This did not imply the opposite
of Clapper, that the state of injury is the only one whose law may be applied, but
rather that either state may apply its law, provided it has substantial and significant
connection with the facts to which its law is applied. Clapper seemed to say that
the full faith and credit clause picked out one major factual contact in each set of
facts, and required all states to give conclusive effect to the "public act" of the state
where that major factual contact was located. The later cases tell us that, for workmen's compensation at least, the clause no longer makes that choice between factual
contacts, but leaves each forum free to make the choice for itself, so long as the law
chosen is supported by substantial factual contacts.
III
A GENERAL TEsT: FAIR PLAY AND SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE
The commercial law, insurance, and workmen's compensation areas of constitutional control just discussed are merely representative, and whatever general conclusions are drawn from them may be assumed to be broadly applicable to choice
of law in torts, property, and other private law fields as well. Determination of
property claims by a law which has no substantial connection with the facts would
'Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
62 349 U.S. 408 (1955). See Stone, The Forum's Policy and the Defense of Faith and Credit to
Workmen's Compensation Acts, 41 IowA L. REv. 558 (1956).
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pretty clearly be unconstitutional." Although there is more room for argument
about tort claims, the same conclusion must be reached as to them 4 and as to any
other type of substantive private claim (or defense) that anyone might assert.
Furthermore, these standard private law problems cannot be isolated from other
less private choice of law areas, not so frequently discussed under the conflict of
laws heading, such as criminal law, 5 state taxation,"' divorce," and domestic re.
lations law generally. And there is the obvious correlation between the constitutional
limits on choice of law in these "legislative jurisdiction" areas and those imposed by
the due process clause under the head of "judicial jurisdiction.""
The Clapper case is not the only early United States Supreme Court decision that
will be dropped by the wayside if this analysis of the more recent cases is sound.
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Delta and Pine Land Co. 0 is another, and

there are more, though some of them can probably be ignored rather than overruled 7 0
In Hartford, a Mississippi court was prevented from applying its own substantive
law to defeat a time limitation clause in a Tennessee contract insuring against
Mississippi losses from Mississippi risks covered by the policy. The Mississippi
factual contacts with the cause of action were certainly substantial. They were more
71
substantial than the California contacts in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
where judicial jurisdiction was sustained on comparable facts, and just as substantial
as in Watson v. Employers Liability Insurance Corp.,72 the Louisiana direct action
case, and Carroll v. Lanza,'3 the Arkansas tort-workmen's compensation case which
finally obliterated Clapper. If place of making the contract is not to be automatically
regarded as the controlling factor, Mississippi's factual contacts with the case were
at least as substantial as Tennessee's. The current "states' rights in choice of law"
attitude of the Court would surely permit Mississippi to apply its time limitation
eAs to land, see Selover, Bates & Co. v. Walsh, 226 U.S. 112 (1912), and Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S.
As to tangible
171 (1916); Goodrich, Two States and Real Estate, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 417 (941).
movables, see Leflar, Constitutional Jurisdiction Over Tangible Chattels, 2 Mo. L. Rev. 171 (1937),
an analysis which went too far in suggesting constitutional limits but which nevertheless has some
soundness in it. Cf. In re Thornton's Estate, i Cal.2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934).
" Cf. Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 283 (1933); Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F.2d 942 (2d
Cir. 1934).
" See WILLIAM L. CLARK & W. L. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES xi8 (6th cd.
1958); Berge, Criminal Jurisdiction and the Territorial Principle, 30 MICH. L. REV. 238 (1931); Note,
15 U. MIAmi L. REV. 428 (i96i).
"6Cf. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (19o5); State Tax Comm'r of
Braniff Airways v. Nebraska, 347 U.S. 590 (1954). See
Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (942);
Bittker, The Taxation of Out-of-State Tangible Property, 56 YALE L.J. 640 (1947).
"'See Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 3 d Cir. 1953), vacated as moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954).
Compare Wheat v. Wheat, 229 Ark. 842, 318 S.W.2d 793 (x958).
" Supra notes 5, 6, 7.
The facts are stated supra note 56.
292 U.S. 143 (1934).
o E.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, supra note 5o, and New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, supra note
53. But see State Board of Insurance v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451 (1962) (interpretation of
congressional intent, under exercise of commerce power, to retain Allgeyer rule). It may be necessary,
however, for the fraternal benefit society cases, supra note 47, to be overruled explicitly if that line
of authority is to be eliminatd.
1'355 U.S. 220 (1957)72348 U.S. 66 (1954).
78349 U.S. 408 (1955).
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rules to a set of facts in which such numerous and significant local concerns are
evident.
But in a more doubtful case, how much of local concerns must be evident before
a court is free to apply its own substantive law to a case? It is easy to say that the
local contacts must be "substantial" or "significant," but these are inexact words.
They are vague and difficult to apply to specific facts. A number of attempts have
been made to formulate a clearer test. The word "reasonableness," or some corollary,
is central to most of the attempts.
Professor Weintraub devised a test of reasonableness based on "unfair surprise."
Sufficiency of local contacts to make it reasonable for the state's law to be used in
adjudicating the particular controversy, coupled with the condition that if the
state's contact was acquired so late in the series of events (as in Home Insurance Co.
v. Dick) that "to apply its law would result in a serious disregard of the justifiable

expectations of one of the parties" and "inject an element of unfair surprise" is the
test proposedV4 This seems to be an acceptable restatement of the concept of "fair
play and substantial justice," with added concreteness afforded by the words "unfair
surprise," but it too is difficult to apply to specific facts. Professor Overton's earlier
test of "an arbitrary and capricious application of laws that have no fair or decent
connection with the transaction"" is similarly helpful but similarly indefinite as well.
A. "Governmental Interest" and "Weighing"
For many years the courts, both in the common law cases and in those presenting
constitutional questions, have accompanied their references to factual contacts in a
state with references to the local concerns or interests which grew out of these
contacts. Thus in Watson the Court spoke of Louisiana's "legitimate interest in
safeguarding the rights of persons injured there,"76 and in an earlier insurance case
the Supreme Court pointed out that "a state may have substantial interest in the ...
insurance of its people or property ... measured by highly realistic considerations
such as the protection of the citizen insured or the protection of the state from the
incidents of loss."' 77 Comparable language undertaking to identify social, political,

economic, and even cultural interests attributable to a state because of the incidence
of local factors in a litigated case has been employed hundreds of times.
It was from this background that Professor Brainerd Currie developed his
"governmental interests" theory78 to the effect that, if a forum state's connection
with the facts in dispute gives it a "legitimate interest" in having its law applied
"' Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's Choice of Law, 44
L. REV. 449, 455-57 (1959). And see Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict ProblemsTorts, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 215, 239 (1963).
" Overton, State Decisions in Conflict of Laws and Review by the United States Supreme Court
Under the Due Process Clause, 22 ORE. L. REv. io9, 170 (943).
16348 U.S. 66, 73 (1954). And see supra note 59.
77Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 33, 316 (1942).
This was connected with an
implied rejection of "conceptualistic discussion of theories of the place of contracting or of performance."
7' Currie's position is set out in numerous papers, but is most completely presented in Currie, The
Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. Cm. L. REv.
9 (1958).
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to the facts, it is not only permissible under the Constitution but generally desirable
that the forum's law be applied almost automatically. The fact that this automatic
application of interest-connected forum law would avoid all "weighing" of competing
interests of other states and would eliminate all choices of law based on such selected
facts as the place of making a contract or the place of injury in a tort case is regarded
as a choice-of-law advantage independent of constitutional considerations. By
avoiding the weighing of competing state interests, the approach would preclude
judicial reliance upon public policy factors in making choices of governing law, and
would accordingly take what Currie identifies as "political questions" away from the
courts. Currie feels strongly that these political questions are, at both the common
law and the constitutional level, legislative rather than judicial in character. At the
constitutional level, this means that the due process, full faith and credit, and other
relevant constitutional clauses are self-executing to the extent of limiting application
of any state's law to interest-connected situations, but that limitations beyond that
simple one should await congressional legislation under the implementing powers
conferred by the several clauses.
It is evident that neither the state courts nor the United States Supreme Court
have in years gone by restrained themselves, as Currie now proposes, from weighing
competing state interests or considering policy factors, either in deciding common
law choice-of-law problems or in determining constitutional limitations on state
choice-of-law rules. In Clapper there was an implication that New Hampshire
might not have been required to give faith and credit to Vermont's public act had it
been shown that the act was truly "obnoxious to New Hampshire's public policy,"
and this proviso on compelled faith and credit has been repeated more clearly by
the Court nearly a dozen times since then. In the fraternal benefit society cases the
choice of law which is affirmatively compelled has consistently been put on "evaluated
79
public policy" of the affected states, as in Wolfe:
... the weight of public policy behind the general statute of South Dakota, which seeks
to avoid certain provisions in ordinary contracts, does not equal that which makes
necessary the recognition of the same terms of membership for members of fraternal benefit societies wherever their beneficiaries may be.
However much one may disagree with the conclusion that the claims of fraternal
benefit society members must all be determined by one law, it remains true that
there are some situations (corporate stockholder relations appear to be one) in which
a comparison of the interests and policies of different states having factual contacts
with the transaction will point clearly to only one state as the one whose law should
govern.
B. Policy Evaluation
It may be said that in these cases the chosen law is that of the only state having
a real governmental interest in the transaction, that other states' contacts were
insufficient to give them a governmental interest. That conclusion is itself one of
" Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 624 (x947).

See supra note 47.
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policy, necessarily. The evaluation of any contact, to determine whether it gives rise
to a "legitimate governmental interest" in the state, i.e., whether it substantially
concerns the state to which it relates, is a policy evaluation. When Watson and
Carroll v. Lanza held that occurrence of an injury plus a few surrounding facts in
a particular state was enough to permit that state's law to govern, they reached a
policy conclusion. When Professor Currie suggests"0 that the occurrence of an auto
accident in Ontario, on the essentially New York facts of Babcock v. Jackson,"
might well be deemed insufficient to give Ontario a genuine governmental interest
that would support application of its law to the case, he too is making a judgment
which includes a comparison of values inherent in asserted interests. In the same
sense he is determining a "political question." It is impossible to deal with
"governmental interests," either by discovering their existence, by denying their
existence, or by deliberately comparing them, without making policy judgments concerning them and the grounds on which they are deemed substantial or insubstantial.
Furthermore, not all "governmental interests," especially in a federal nation, are
state interests. In the United States there are national interests that transcend state
interests. Some of them arise out of national responsibility in international affairs,
some out of the nature of the federal union. If a choice of law case involves
matters of serious international concern, the United States Supreme Court is certainly
able to require from a forum court a choice of law that will respect the national
interest. By the same token, if there be some important internal national interest,
perhaps in assuring uniformity of result or rule in a particular legal area, or even
in assuring a socioeconomic, political, or other practical convenience that in the
national view far outweighs local concerns, the Court will equally be justified in
exercising its power to control the choice of law. This is true despite congressional
power to make the choice, especially for problems as to which it will not do to wait
for Congress to act because Congress is so preoccupied with other issues that it is
in no hurry to act.
The society and the economy of the United States today transcend state lines,
and the governmental interests which relate to them are in many respects interstate
and international in their legal identification. They are often not confined by the
state lines around which the Amercian law of conflict of laws has developed, nor
by the "states' rights" tradition of American political oratory. These governmental
interests are larger matters such as human rights, the security of transactions, the
protection of property, and assurance of relief against harms unjustifiably inflicted.
They include "the just result in the individual case," but only as one among several
considerations. Some of the larger concepts of governmental interest inhere in
"SCurrie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New Yort, 1963 DutK L.J. , 38.
The holding, severely criticized by Currie,
81 17 App.Div.2d 694, 230 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1962).
was that Ontario's guest statute barred recovery because the auto accident happened there, even though
the auto host and guest, and the auto, were all from New York and were only making a weekend trip
r
into Ontario. The decision was reversed by the court of appeals in 12 N.Y.2d 473, 19 N.E.nd 279,
24o N.Y.S.2d 743 (x963), on a "center of gravity" analysis which involved a frank weighing against
each other of the governmental interests arising from the respective sets of contacts.
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"the law" (the decision as precedent), and some in social and economic policy which
transcend the individual case just as they transcend state boundaries. These larger
interests can and sometimes should override the interests that inhere in this or that
local law even to the extent that the local rule of law indicated by the local interest
ought not to be allowed to govern. Congress could take care of this, but the con.
gressional attitude has been that this is the sort of problem that is best left to the
courts. If the courts in turn abdicate absolutely to Congress, nothing at all will
happen. That is all right for the mass of private litigation. As to this mass,
completely free choice of law by the states produces results that are at least adequate,
perhaps almost ideal. But there are scattered situations, and as the years pass there
are likely to be more of them, in which official national interest, or some socioeconomic interest that is national in its scope and operation, demands a more
enlightened choice-of-law rule. If the Congress enacts one, well and good. But if
the Congress does not, it is part of the courts' traditional function to meet the need.
Not only do cases have to be decided; they are supposed to be decided in accordance
with "fair play and substantial justice."
C. Restrictions on Characterization
The classic tradition in the law of conflict of laws has been to use the characterization device as the key to identification of significant territorial contacts and,
if governmental interests are to be taken into account, to identify these in turn as
tied to the contacts which were deemed significant under the characterization employed. In the course of time, characterization came to be recognized as a flexible
legal tool which does not itself produce results inexorably, but often only affords
logical justification for results independently arrived at. So recognized, characterization cannot today be regarded as an essential part of the process of defining constitutional limits on local choice of law. The significance of factual contacts ought to be
determined with reference to the total situation in a given case, not just by reference
to the technical characterization that has been fastened onto the case by the
plaintiff's attorney or even by the judge. That is what is being done increasingly
nowadays8 2 Despite this, characterization cannot be ignored in connection with the
constitutional problem. If a cause of action is deemed to sound in tort, the common
law has for a century or more associated it with the place of injury. If it sounds in
contract a similar association with the place where the contract was made is equally
shrouded in time, though this contact has more often been bypassed. These traditionally controlling contacts have been employed in choice-of-law cases time and
again without regard to the comparative insignificance of the governmental interests
they may give rise to. The contact has been deemed sufficient without measurement
" Along this line, see Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAs L. REv. 657 (1959).
"No wonder the Supreme Court is now disentangling itself therefrom after some'unhappy efforts to
elevate choice-of-law rules to constitutional rank. It does not follow, however, that Congress either
would or should enact choice-of-law rules post-haste, or even that it should ever enact them wholesale.
As we now finish one long servitude to categorical imperatives, we should be on guard against another."
Id. at 675.
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of the interest. And the minimal requirements prescribed by the due process clause
have been held, perhaps unfortunately, to be met by rules and procedures which
satisfy tradition without satisfying common sense,8 3 as well as by newer ones which
make good sense regardless of tradition. Contacts which have been traditionally
sufficient for choice of law purposes must be deemed still to satisfy the Constitution.
The characterization device still has some substantive effect in determining the
outer limits which the Constitution sets.
An interesting but not particularly difficult variation of the characterization
problem appears when a court grounds its choice of governing law on a characterization which may be inadequate to support the constitutionality of the choice made but
where there is available under the facts another characterization which would support the choice of law. Other ways of describing such a case would be that the facts
have a sufficiently substantial connection with the state whose law is chosen, or that
the governmental interests arising from the facts in that state are sufficiently significant, to justify application of its law, though some other reason for applying that law
was given in the court's opinion. Or it might be said that, regardless of reasons
given, application of the chosen state's law would not be utterly unreasonable, and
would not involve such "serious disregard of the justifiable expectations" of a
party as to "inject an element of unfair surprise" against him, nor constitute "an
arbitrary and capricious application of laws that have no fair or decent connection
with the transaction." This would be equivalent to a conclusion that "fair play and
substantial justice" were not denied by what was done.
The now-famous Kilbergs' case and its companion Pearson8 5 illustrate the
point. The Kilberg holding was that the law of the New York forum governed
measure of damages for a Massachusetts wrongful death, though existence of the
cause of action was deemed to be governed by Massachusetts law. Measure of
damages was for New York public policy reasons characterized as a procedural
matter, so that New York's forum law governed it. This is a doubtful characterization 8 o But the decedent was a New York domiciliary killed while on an airlines
flight from New York under a passenger ticket purchased (contract made) in New
York. New York had enough significant contacts with the transaction to sustain
application of its own substantive law as governing the whole case. The Pearson
decision in the second circuit concluded that the result in Kilberg was not unconstitutional. The minimum contacts essential to constitutionality in choice of law
are to be discovered from the facts in the case, not merely from the state court's
possibly mistaken reasoning and language s
8' E.g., see Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (i92i), sustaining against constitutional attack a
Delaware "foreign attachment," which, though extremely unfair, followed the late medieval Custom of
London as it had been imported into the American colonies. Cf. Midrich v. Lauenstein, 232 U.S. 236
(1914) (sheriff's false return of service).
, Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172 N.E.2d 526 (196r).
Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (x963).
88 New York itself partially backed away from the characterization a year later in Davenport v. Webb,
is N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (z962).
81 ". . . surely a state court does not violate the Constitution when it reaches a perfectly sound result

LAw Am CONTEMPORAY PROBLEMS

The "divided characterization" technique used in Kilberg may also give rise to
some trouble. Assuming that each characterization employed is separately permissible, not hog-wild, does the mere fact of choosing two laws rather than one, so that
part of the case is governed by one state's law and another part by the law of a
different state, raise a constitutional question? If one of the characterizations is that
an issue is procedural so that forum law governs it, and the procedural characterization is clearly a permissible one, there is of course no difficulty. But if the procedural
characterization is a doubtful one, as with measure of damages in Kilberg, or if
different substantive characterizations are used for different elements in the facts,
the problem is present. Thus in Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe,
Burton, J., speaking of fraternal benefit society membership, said :8
It is of the essence of the full faith and credit clause that, if a state gives some faith and
credit to the public acts of another state... then it must give full faith and credit to
those public acts....
And Friendly, J., dissenting in Pearson, thought that, though New York was not
required by the Constitution to apply Massachusetts law to a set of facts with so
many New York facets, once New York chose to determine the right by Massachusetts law it should not under the full faith and credit clause be free to "take
what is liked and reject what is disliked" from the sister state's public act."'
The answer to this constitutional doubt appears to lie in the "reasonable" severability of issues, "reasonableness" in this context having the same meaning that it has
in the "fair play and substantial justice" concept that fixes constitutional limits for
other choice-of-law problems. Such a severance of issues is reasonable and sensible
when the interests relevant to each are centered at different places, as where the
question concerns liabilities between family members domiciled in one state for a
tort committed in another state, ° or the effect of an automobile guest statute on a
tort committed in one state when all the parties and the car come from another
state.' These are different from "rules of the road." So, when an issue relates
primarily to the method of trial, as when jury trial is prescribed by one state's law
and judge trial without a jury by another's, or relates to pleadings or evidence, it is
but uses language that gives offense to doctrinal purists." Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Conlusion in
New Yor/(, 1963 DuxE L.J. 1, 28, in turn quoting Black, J., in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-on-Drugs, Inc.,
366 U.S. 276, 284 (596): "So even if the state court had rested its conclusions on an improper ground,
this Court could not, in view of the undisputed facts establishing its validity, declare a solemn act
of the state of New Jersey unconstitutional."
3331 U.S. 586, 625 (1947). The case is discussed supra note 47. Compare Currie, The Constitu.
lion and the Choice of Law, 26 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 9, 63 (1958): "[the Court] ... ought also to understand
that a transaction may be governed, in some or all of its aspects, by the laws of two or more states,
as their interests may appear."
"309 Fad 553, 566 (2d Cir. 1962).
"Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal.2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (x955); Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7
Wis.2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (r959); Haynie v. Hanson, x6 Wis.2d 299, 114 N.W.2d 443 (x962).
"'Babcock v. Jackson, supra note 8s. Another illustration of separable issues is as between the
commision of a tort by an alleged servant at one place and existence of a relationship justifying vicarious
liability on another person by reference to the law of some other place where the asserted relationship
was centered. Garrison v. Ryno, 328 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 1959). Compare Venuto v. Robinson, xI8 F.ad
679 (3d Cir. 1941).
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reasonable to characterize the particular issue as a procedural one to be governed
by forum law. The conduct of litigation centers at the place where the litigation is
conducted. But that leads on to the hard questions, when some issue that may be
outcome-determinative in the case, or which like measure of damages determines
the size of the right, or like a statute of limitations determines whether any action
may be brought, is classified as procedural. Home Insurance Co. v. Dick9 2 and
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Yates"5 warn us that the procedural
characterization can go too far. It goes too far not because of any technical rule of
characterization, but for the same "fair play and substantial justice" reasons that

make it unconstitutional when any court deprives any person of his life, liberty, or
property by applying a law which has so little of substantial connection with his case
as to make the application an unreasonable one.
CONCLUSION

But what is unreasonable?

As a constitutional concept, the word has no exact

definition now, never has had, and probably never will have. It is a fluctuating
amalgam of considerations, traditions, attitudes, and reactions.
When the word is tied down to some particular factual or legal context, it seems
more definite. This is true when it is in its choice-of-law context. Here, it is clear
that the outcome-determinative effect of a given rule does not bar its being classified
as procedural. Almost any procedural rule can sometimes affect the outcome of
litigation, and the Erie outcome-determinative test9 4 classifies as substantive many
rules which have traditionally been characterized as procedural for choice-of-law
purposes. Tradition in conflicts law plays an important part in determining what
is to be deemed unreasonable. The content of the procedural classification is largely
a matter of tradition. If damages rules and statutes of limitations had not in the
past been matters for forum law it is doubtful that they would as an original
question be so regarded today. Tradition can be abandoned, but it is apt to be
abandoned slowly, gradually, and only in the face of urgent demands that "fair play
and substantial justice" be more completely achieved. As to damages and limitations, the traditionally permissible applicability of forum rules is more apt to be
nibbled away from the edges than to be eliminated suddenly. These rules have
not yet come to be regarded as terribly bad.
Considerations of the general public interest, including the national interest in
international and federal relationships and our ever-broadening American interest
in socioeconomic and human values that transcend state lines, are increasingly a part
of our constitutional concept of what is unreasonable, whether in choice of law or
other areas. Respect for the interests of the states, even for asserted state interests
that may be difficult to identify or accept, is a major element in the constitutional
"11281 U.S. 397 (1930)"299 U.S. 178 (1936).
"See Sedler, The Erie Outcome Test as a Guide to Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws,
37 N.Y.U.L. Rtv. 813, 877 (x962).
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concept, perhaps the most important single element in the whole concept as it
operates in the choice-of-law area. In a federal nation the governmental interests of
the states which comprise it vary according to the allocations of power in the federal
structure, but in the United States the reservoir of power is in the states. State
governmental interests are to be respected, along with the policies they represent,
and so are national ones. Both enter into the amalgam of definition which marks
the outer limits of what is reasonable.
There is nothing in the reasonableness concept of "fair play and substantial
justice" that would necessarily bar choice of law in terms of general rules of law
rather than in terms of the law of particular territorial states. The conflict of laws
cases still speak almost unanimously a language of "choice of jurisdictions," so that
the law of one state or another must be selected as governing, but they might instead
speak in terms of an actual "choice of rules of law" regardless of political territories.95
Thus, if two or more interest-connected states have identical or compatible rules
of law, and the law of a third connected state is different, it would be possible to
choose as governing the laws of the two states as an undifferentiated but coordinated
unit, as against the law of the third state. It would even be possible to choose
deliberately the rule of law which would best serve the needs of the parties and
the purposes of their transaction, in keeping with state policyY0 The constitutional
permissibility of this would be difficult to attack.
The defining of constitutional unreasonableness is a weighing of values, a weighing in which a great preponderance of values, but not absolutely all of them, must
be on one side before it will be decided that a choice-of-law decision the other way
is unconstitutional. There is no mathematical formula to tell us when the necessary
preponderance exists. The identification of governmental interests, both national
and state, is essential to the process, since that identifies what is to be weighed. But
a set of scales with some kind of markers on it is also essential. The scales are of
course in the constitutional clauses themselves, in their "fair play and substantial
justice" requirement which as time goes on will presumably be given further
definition, but which of a certainty will be marked to preclude what is unreasonable:
any "arbitrary and capricious application of laws that have no fair or decent connection with the transaction" in litigation; laws which involve such "serious disregard
of the justifiable expectations" of a party as to "inject an element of unfair surprise
" Cf. Frank,

J.,

in Walton v. Arabian-American Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541, 545 n.14a (2d Cir. x956):

"As the tort rules, pertinent here, of New York, Delaware, and Arkansas are doubtless substantially

similar, there would be no need to choose one or the other."

The "choice of rules of law" suggestion

was introduced in Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 183, 201
(933), and is elaborated slightly in Cavers, Restating the Conflict of Laws: The Chapter on Contracts,
in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CoN'Lxcrs LAw (LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR op HESSEL E.

349, 350 (i96i). The Contracts chapter in the Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws takes
a timid step in this direction by proposing that if the relevant rules in two or more states which have
contacts with the contract are the same, "the case will be treated ... as if these contacts were grouped
in a single state." RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CoNFLIcr OF LAws § 332(b), comment c (Tent. Draft No. 6,
YNTEMA)

596o).
" Compare Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (927).
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against him"; and laws that would defeat governmental interests which have truly
outstanding national significance.
What is the area left for congressional implementation? The answer suggests
itself. It is the area within which, in the absence of congressional implementation,
the states have been and are free to do as they please. Beyond that lies the area of
unreasonableness in which application of a given law violates "fair play and substantial justice." Congress is as completely bound not to violate that outer limit on
choice of law which the self-executing part of the Constitution prescribes as are the
states and their courts. The Supreme Court of the United States may from time to
time change its determinations as to what choices of law go beyond the outer limits,
and it may be hoped that some of them will be changed soon; but whatever those
limits are, they are binding. On the safe side of those limits, however, congressional
power under the implementing clauses is vast. The power would probably comprehend enactment of a complete code on choice of law. Another hope, that this will
be somewhat further delayed, may also be expressed.

